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&ULPLQDOLVLQJWKHµcriminal tULEH¶3DUWLWLRQborders and the state in 
,QGLD¶V3XQMDE-55 
 
On 15 August 2000, the fifty third anniversary of ,QGLD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHIURP%ULWLVK
FRORQLDO UXOH WKH 3XQMDE QHZVSDSHU 7KH 7ULEXQH UHSRUWHG WKDW µWKH backward Rai Sikh 
FRPPXQLW\FRQWLQXHVWROLYHZLWKWKHODEHORI³FULPLQDOWULEH´JLYHQWRWKHPE\WKHVWDWHGXULQJ
WKHGD\VRIVODYHU\¶1 Most of the community resided close to the Indo-Pakistan border, on the 
Indian side, predominantly in the district of Ferozepore. In 1947, they had been displaced from 
their homes in Montgomery (present day Sahiwal, Pakistan) during the upheaval of Partition 
and independence. Frequently accused of smuggling, the newspaper claimed, sources from 
ZLWKLQWKHSROLFHµDGPLWWKDt the villages dominated by Rai Sikhs, especially those along the 
ERUGHUUHPDLQRQWKHLUZDWFKOLVW¶2 The Rai Sikhs were one of approximately 200 ethnic groups 
in the subcontinent whom the colonial government declared to be µFULPLQDOWULEHs¶XQGHUWKH
draconian Criminal Tribes Act.3 Yet, a remarkably small proportion of the community 
(numbering, at most, a few thousand) was actually notified under the Act, with few individuals 
under active registration or surveillance.4 Notably, it was in the years after independence ± a 
period largely neglected by studies on the Criminal Tribes Act ± that the Rai Sikhs came to be 
more conclusively aligned with the category of the criminal tribe in the bureaucratic practices 
of the state. The article contends that this process was no mere colonial legacy but rather the 
product of concerns that related to the contingent and uncertain nature of the early postcolonial 
state, specifically those associated with the newly-imposed border.  
                                                          
This paper was presented at the British Association of South Asian Studies Annual Conference 2017 at the 
University of Nottingham, the Comparative Histories of Asia Doctoral Presentation Prize at the Institute of 
Historical Research, the )XWXUH¶V Past: South Asia Now and Then workshop at the University of Leeds, and the 
Imperial Afterlives workshop at the University of York. I am grateful for all the comments made. I would like to 
especially thank William Gould, Jonathan Saha, Elisabeth Leake, Oliver Godsmark and Jonathan Howlett for 
reading earlier drafts of the paper. 
1
 ³5DL6LNKVVWLOO6WLJPDWLVHG$FFXVH3ROLFHRI%LDV´The Tribune, 15 August, 2000. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 The Criminal Tribes Act gave the colonial government the power to declare µDQ\ tribe, gang or class of SHUVRQV¶ 
or parts thereof, whom it believed to be µDGGLFWHG to the systematic commission of non-bailable RIIHQFHV¶ as 
µFULPLQDO WULEHV¶ through notification in the local Gazette. Once notified, individuals belonging to such 
communities, whether implicated in criminal activity or not, faced excessive measures of penal control, such as 
attending daily roll call or being restricted within the limits of RQH¶V village. There is conflicting evidence as to 
the exact number of communities who were declared as criminal tribes across the subcontinent but 200 is the most 
commonly given estimate. 
4
 In Ferozepore, 6,000 individuals were notified under the Criminal Tribes Act, out of a population of 30,000. Rai 
Sikhs numbered around 50,000 in Montgomery. Punjab State Archives, Chandigarh (PSA)/Punjab Government 
Civil Secretariat (PGCS)/Welfare & General±B/1955/118. 
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Situated in the formative years following Partition and independence, the article 
contributes to the growing body of scholarship on the state and decolonisation in the 
subcontinent.5 In particular, it furthers our understanding of the role that the border played in 
both generating and overcoming uncertainties over state authority and control. The 
establishment of two independent nation states in the years after 1947 was a drawn out and 
contested process which raised questions of loyalty, belonging, and the legitimacy of the state.6 
The following decade was one in which territorial borders were redrawn and more conceptual 
boundaries between nations, communities and identities were redefined.7 When the British 
Government transferred power on 14/15th August, it was amidst violence and the dislocation 
of the state apparatus. Nowhere was this felt more immediately and forcefully than in the 
province of Punjab, itself territorially divided along religious lines between India and Pakistan, 
displacing at least 12 million people.8 Several scholars have noted the emergence of a 
regulatory regime in early postcolonial South Asia, whereby governmental techniques marked 
RXWµVXVSHFWGLVOR\DOFLWL]HQV¶IURPµSXWDWLYHO\QDWXUDORQHV¶ODUJHO\RQDUHOLJLRXVEDVLV9 The 
establishment of political and territorial borders in the new nations inextricably determined, 
and was in turn shaped by, the demarcation of categories of identities and belonging.10 At a 
more local level, too, the imposition of the territorial border reconfigured  existing, albeit fluid, 
categories of identity ± in this instance, the more conclusive incorporation of the Rai Sikhs 
within the boundaries of the criminal tribe.  
The British colonial government enacted the Criminal Tribes Act in 1871 (although it 
was subject to several amendments, notably in 1911 and 1924) in an effort to control what it 
                                                          
5
 Chatterji, ³6RXWK Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946-´ Gould, Bureaucracy, Community, and Influence 
in India: Society and the State, 1930s-1960s; Gould, Sherman, and Ansari, ³7KH Flux of the 0DWWHU´ Guyot-
Réchard, Shadow States; Haines, Rivers Divided; Leake, The Defiant Border; Sen, ³5HIXJHHV and the Politics of 
Nation Building in India, 1947-´ Sherman, Gould, and Ansari, From Subjects to Citizens; Zamindar, The 
Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia. 
6
 Gould, Sherman, and Ansari, ³7KH Flux of the 0DWWHU´ 
7
 Oliver Godsmark makes the important point that Partition was just one instance of redrawing borders in this 
period and needs to be resituated within a longer history that encompasses the integration of the Princely States 
and the reorganisation of states in the mid-1950s. Oliver Godsmark, µPartition, Linguistic Reorganisation and 
3URYLQFLDOLVDWLRQ¶ conference paper delivered at British Association of South Asian Studies, University of 
Nottingham, 20 April 2017. For scholarship on more conceptual boundaries of identity, community and nation 
see Chatterji, ³6RXWK Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946-´ Menon and Bhasin, Borders & Boundaries; 
Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India; Roy, Partitioned Lives; Zamindar, 
The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia. 
8
 The Punjab and Bengal provinces were both partitioned at independence. Khan, The Great Partition: The Making 
of India and Pakistan. 
9
 Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia, 11. Also Chatterji, ³6RXWK Asian Histories 
of Citizenship, 1946-´ Roy, Partitioned Lives.  
10
 Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia, 3. 
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SHUFHLYHGDV,QGLD¶VµFULPLQDO¶FRPPXQLWLHVE\ZD\RIFROOHFWLYHO\-imposed surveillance and 
reformatory measures.11 In 1952, following prolonged denouncement of its illiberal nature, the 
Government of India repealed the Act.12 The Rai Sikhs had been awkwardly entangled with 
the Act since the late 1880s. They were a branch of the Mahtam caste, although the exact 
distinction and genealogy between the communities is unclear. In colonial Punjab, Mahtams 
were mostly low-caste Hindus but around one fifth identified as Muslim and a similar number 
as Sikh, a branch of which were known as Rais.13 From at least the 1920s, Rai Sikhs were 
found in Montgomery. They often worked as tenants or labourers, although it was also common 
for families to own land. As such, they were predominantly settled on the land and, unlike most 
of the so-called criminal tribes, were not known for their nomadic lifestyles.14 In 1888, the 
Punjab Government declared a small number of Mahtams residing in Lahore district a criminal 
tribe on the basis of local complaints.15 In 1926, it declared a further 57 individuals ± this time 
Rai Sikhs ± as a criminal tribe in the village of Dhakkar, Montgomery district.16 By the 1940s, 
UHSRUWV RI WKHLU µFULPLQDO SURFOLYLWLHV¶ KDG LQFUHDVHG DQG WHQ YLOODJHV LQ 0RQWJRPHU\ ZHUH
placed under direct supervision by the Criminal Tribes Department.17 Despite this, though, the 
proportion of the community who was directly targeted by the Criminal Tribes Act remained 
negligible.  
                                                          
11
 Brown, Penal Power and Colonial Rule.; Brown, ³&ULPH Liberalism and (PSLUH´ Major, ³6WDWH and Criminal 
Tribes in Colonial Punjab: Surveillance, Control and Reclamation of the µ'DQJHURXV &ODVVHV¶´ Nigam, 
³'LVFLSOLQLQJ and Policing the µ&ULPLQDOV by %LUWK¶ Part 1: The Making of a Colonial Stereotype - The Criminal 
Tribes and Castes of North ,QGLD´ Nigam, ³'LVFLSOLQLQJ and Policing the µ&ULPLQDOV by %LUWK¶ Part 2: The 
Development of a Disciplinary System, 1871-´ Radhakrishna, Dishonoured by History; Singha, A 
Despotism of Law. 
12
 The Government of India repealed the Act centrally on 31 August 1952. The state governments of Madras and 
Bombay had already repealed the Act, in 1947 and 1949 respectively, whilst it had become a µGHDG OHWWHU¶ or was 
replaced by legislation targeting individual µKDELWXDO RIIHQGHUV¶ in many other states. For brief treatises on the 
post-1947 period and criminal tribes, see Brown, ³3RVWFRORQLDO Penality: Liberty and Repression in the Shadow 
of Independence, India C. ´ Piliavsky, ³%RUGHUV without Borderlands: On the Social Reproduction of State 
Demarcation in 5DMDVWKDQ´ Radhakrishna, ³/DZV of Metamorphosis: From Nomad to 2IIHQGHU´ 
13
 Rose, A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province, 49±50. 
14
 Kishan Kaul and Tomkins, Report on Questions Related to the Administration of Criminal and Wandering 
Tribes in the Punjab, 3. 
15
 It should be noted that the nomenclature of µWULEH¶ is somewhat misleading and must be contextualised in 1870s 
northern India, especially Punjab, wherein µWULEH¶ had a fluid designation, often used interchangeably with µUDFH¶ 
and µFDVWH¶ to denote ethnic affiliation, as opposed to later, more static interpretations related to so-called 
µDERULJLQDO¶ groups. 
16
 British Library, India Office Records (IOR)/V/24/633: Report on the Administration of Criminal Tribes in the 
Punjab for the year ending December 1926. 
17
 National Archives of India (NAI)/Punjab States Agency(General)/1942/G-21-7. 
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Soon after 1947, local officials in Ferozepore began reporting to the East Punjab18 
Government, who in turn reported to New Delhi, incidences of illegal cross-border movements 
made by the Rai Sikhs, especially smuggling networks. Before long, the Rai Sikhs had attained 
a notoriety in the national press for dacoity (armed robbery), smuggling, and criminal 
proclivity.19 It is difficult to ascertain from the archive the accuracy of these reports, nor the 
extent and prevalence of such behaviour. Displacement to new environs likely destabilised 
their pre-existing social networks, customs and modes of livelihood, whilst close proximity to 
an international, increasingly militarised and often hostile border surely brought opportunities 
and barriers alike.20 It would, however, be problematic to infer the practical or symbolic 
significance of the border for the Rai Sikhs themselves, given the limitations of the archive. 
The entry of marginalised groups into the colonial/postcolonial archive was predicated upon 
the demands of the state, which consigned such groups to be studied only in relation to their 
consequent designation ± as criminal tribes rather than Rai Sikhs, for instance.21 An attempt to 
recover their subjectivities would be futile, given that even the rare incidences of community 
petitions are irretrievably shaped by inherent power dynamics and the languages of rule. No 
doubt, efforts should be made to re-position their experiences in Partition historiography, which 
has largely overlooked marginal DQGµXQWRXFKDEOH¶FRPPXQLWLHV.22 Such an approach is beyond 
the bounds of this article, however. Instead, it seeks to enrich our understanding of the state at 
this critical historical juncture. 
The article examines the ways in which the postcolonial state sought to overcome its 
uncertainties regarding the border, namely through the bureaucratic practices and discourse of 
local state actors, although it recognises that the actions of the Rai Sikhs also necessarily 
constituted such processes.23 It argues that, through these practices and discourse, the 
                                                          
18
 When referring to the provincial government of the Indian state of Punjab, this article uses East Punjab to 
distinguish it from its Pakistani counterpart. The µ(DVW¶ was dropped in 1950 but for clarity it is retained 
throughout. 
19
 For example, see The Tribune, 5 September, 1951; 30 October, 1952; 15 June, 1953; 28 December, 1954. 
20
 Willem van Schendel, µ:RUNLQJ Through Partition: Making a Living in the Bengal %RUGHUODQGV¶ International 
Review of Social History, 46.3 (2001), p. 151. 
21
 Spivak, ³7KH Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the $UFKLYHV´ Stoler, ³&RORQLDO Archives and the Arts of 
*RYHUQDQFH´ 
22
 There is a growing field of scholarship on µXQWRXFKDEOHV¶ and Partition, although this largely overlooks Punjab. 
For example, Balasubrahmanyan, ³3DUWLWLRQ and Gujarat: The Tangled Web of Religious, Caste, Community and 
Gender ,GHQWLWLHV´ Bandyopadhyay, ³7UDQVIHU of Power and the Crisis of Dalit Politics in India, 1945-´ Kaur, 
³1DUUDWLYH $EVHQFH´ Pandey, ³µ1RERG\¶V 3HRSOH¶ The Dalits of Punjab in the Forced Removal of ´ Rawat, 
³3DUWLWLRQ Politics and Achhut Identity: A Study of the Scheduled Castes Federation and Dalit Politics in 83´ 
Sen, ³&DVWH Politics and Partition in South Asian +LVWRU\´ Although the Rai Sikhs are classed as a Scheduled 
Caste in East Punjab, this aspect of their community identity is not the focus of this article. 
23
 On the µXQFHUWDLQWLHV¶ of the postcolonial state in this period, see Gould, Sherman, and Ansari, ³7KH Flux of the 
0DWWHU´.  On the role of ordinary people in constituting the state and its processes, see Fuller and Bénéï, The 
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postcolonial state redefined categories of identity ± specifically, the label of the criminal tribe 
± by way of constructing criminality in relation to the border. These constructions, whether 
superficial or not, provide an important insight into the imperatives of the state at its peripheral 
reaches, however contested and contradictory these may have been. First, the article 
contextualises these actions within a broader reconfiguration of cross-border movement in the 
borderlands of East Punjab as forms of crime. Next, it traces the postcolonial criminalisation 
of the Rai Sikhs themselves to demonstrate that the process was inextricably linked to the 
establishment of the border, and the resultant concerns of local state actors. Finally, it argues 
that this process simultaneously worked to produce the border itself, namely through projects 
of state development and defence. Although centred on a specific community in a particular 
region over a limited time-frame, the article illuminates broader issues pertaining to 
decolonisation, state-building and the demarcation of borders. 
 
Criminalising the Border 
Borders in South Asia prior to and during the colonial period were characterised by 
permeability as persons, goods and ideas travelled far across the subcontinent and further 
afield.24 This fluidity often stands in stark contrast to the increased fixity ascribed to the 
political and territorial boundaries of national space after 1947. Yet, many borders in South 
Asia, especially at its peripheries, remained porous ± often intentionally ± for a long time after 
the establishment of distinct nation-states.25 Even in Punjab, the Indo-Pakistani border was 
considered in relatively fluid terms for many months after Partition. The territorial division of 
the subcontinent had been accepted as a solution to political obstinacy but many thought that 
the border would remain an open space between the two nations.26 Migration was initially 
considered as a short-term solution to the communal violence of Partition and many expected 
to return to their homes after order was restored. Until at least March 1948, for example, the 
policy of the East Punjab Government was to treat the criminal tribes who had been displaced 
                                                          
Everyday State and Society in Modern India; Gupta, ³%OXUUHG Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the 
Culture of Politics, and the Imagined 6WDWH´ 
24
 Gellner, Borderland Lives in Northern South Asia; Markovits, Pouchepadass, and Subrahmanyam, Society and 
Circulation. 
25
 In Kutch, for instance, a regime of border management only emerged in the 1960s. Gellner, Borderland Lives 
in Northern South Asia; Guyot-Réchard, Shadow States; Ibrahim, ³%XUHDXFUDF\ and Border Control: Crime, 
Police Reform and National Security in Kutch, 1948-´ Leake, The Defiant Border; van Schendel, ³:RUNLQJ 
Through Partition: Making a Living in the Bengal %RUGHUODQGV´ Schendel, The Bengal Borderland. 
26
 Chatterji, ³6RXWK Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946-´ Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of 
Modern South Asia. 
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during the violence as µRQ OHDYH IURPWKHLUSODFHVRIGHWHQWLRQ LQ WKH:HVW3XQMDE¶27 State 
policy treated their movement as an aberration, rather than an ongoing possibility.  
As migration came to be considered more permanent, however, the border ± and 
understandings of criminality alongside it ± shifted in the practices of the state.28 In the years 
that followed, the border had to be repeatedly constructed, performed and made real on the 
ground in Punjab until its demarcation was completed in 1960.29 Through the placing of border 
stones, the patrolling of police forces, and the establishment of the Border Security Force, the 
imperceptible border was stamped across the landscape.30 As relations deteriorated between 
India and Pakistan, the border became an increasingly rigid and militarised space denoting the 
limits of two national identities, movement across which could undermine not only the security 
of the state but also its very legitimacy.31 From July 1948, DµFRQWUROUHJLPH¶ZDVLQDXJXUDWHG
by both the Indian and Pakistani Governments, through which state actors increasingly 
regulated movement across the border.32 Through their routine and banal everyday actions, the 
state demarcated between those classed as citizens and those relegated to be outsiders.33 There 
was, and remains, an inherent selectivity, therefore, in the degree of permeability across the 
border, which was often determined along axes of religion, class and gender.34  
One way in which state actors delineated the permeability of the border was the 
criminalisation of cross-border movements and networksUHGHILQHGDVµVPXJJOLQJ¶ which had 
historically traversed the region. Through the mechanisms of state surveillance, restriction and 
enforcement of regulations which attempted to limit these movements, the state brought the 
border into effect. The perception of what constitutes µVPXJJOLQJ¶ is time and geography 
dependent. Changing circumstances denote certain goods as contraband at certain times 
depending on local imperatives and the shifting nature of the border.35 After Partition, the flow 
                                                          
27
 NAI/Home(Police-I)/1949/22/1. 
28
 Chatterji, ³6RXWK Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946-´ Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of 
Modern South Asia. 
29
 Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia. 
30
 Reece Jones has demonstrated this process with regard to Bengal. Reece Jones, µ$JHQWV of Exception: Border 
Security and the Marginalization of Muslims in ,QGLD¶ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 27.5 
(2009), 879±97 (p. 883). 
31
 Donnan and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, 5; Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The 
Partition of India, 133. 
32
 The Indian government passed the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance in July 1948 which was swiftly 
followed by the Pakistan JRYHUQPHQW¶V enactment of the Pakistan (Control of Entry) Ordinance in October 1948.  
This permit regime was replaced by a system of passports in 1952. Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making 
of Modern South Asia, 82. 
33
 Ibrahim, ³%XUHDXFUDF\ and Border Control: Crime, Police Reform and National Security in Kutch, 1948-´ 
34
 Wonders, ³*OREDO Flows, Semi-Permeable Borders and New Channels of ,QHTXDOLW\´ 
35
 Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 2. 
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of labour, goods and trade across the newly-established border was increasingly interrupted, 
blocked or criminalised. In effect, these pre-existing movements were reconfigured into what 
Willem van Schendel terms as µLOOHJDOIORZV¶± the movement of commodities, persons or ideas 
across the border which were outlawed by one or more states.36 Local residents had to adapt to 
the changed circumstances as the two nation-states attempted to disentangle their local 
economies from the intricacies of the border regions.37 Trade along historic and deeply-
entrenched routes was reconfigured as smuggling, trafficking or illegal cross-border 
movement. Both the Indian and Pakistani governments introduced customs, permits and 
regulations to control such activities. Yet, in March 1949 the East Punjab Government 
EHPRDQHGWKHRQJRLQJSUDFWLFHRIVPXJJOLQJDFURVVWKHERUGHUµ<DUQZDVUHSRUWHGWREHJRLQJ
from this side and silver and cyclHV ZHUH UHSRUWHG WR EH FRPLQJ IURP WKH 3DNLVWDQ VLGH¶38 
Evidently, despite such regulation there was ongoing movement of everyday articles between 
local communities who had long-standing relations and trade links across what was now an 
international border. In the context of border demarcation, their quotidian routines had become 
an illegal activity. 
The East Punjab Government was also concerned about the ongoing raids and exchange 
of stolen cattle across the border, a practice in which the Rai Sikhs were said to indulge. 
Through 1948, the East Punjab Government regularly reported the activities of µFDWWOH-lifters 
IURP 3DNLVWDQ¶ in their correspondence with New Delhi.39 The close proximity of local 
populations to the mostly unmarked boundary line ensured a VWHDG\VWUHDPRIµERUGHULQFLGHQWV¶
as persons or their livestock, whether accidentally or on purpose, traversed the border.40 
Although some of these incidents were motivated by opportunism, most were merely the 
altered outcome of the ordinary actions of everyday life for local residents. The imposition of 
the border had reconfigured these actions as µLQFLGHQWV¶ZKLFKcontravened both the boundary 
of the state and the limits of the law. As such, regular reports to New Delhi cited the statistics 
RI µERUGHU LQFLGHQWV¶ LQ D JLYHQ PRQWK LQ RUGHU WR MXVWLI\ LQFUHDVHG DUPHG SUHVHQFH DQG
militarisation on and near the border.  
                                                          
36
 van Schendel, ³6SDFHV of Engagement: How Borderlands, Illegal Flows, and Territorial States ,QWHUORFN´ 40. 
37
 Although, as Willem van Schendel argues, the states were both keen to protect certain cross-border trades which 
they saw as beneficial to their national economies, whether on account of their scarcity or strategic use, or because 
they could be taxed. van Schendel, ³:RUNLQJ Through Partition: Making a Living in the Bengal %RUGHUODQGV´ 
440. 
38
 NAI/States(Political)/1949/F.9(45). 
39
 NAI/ States(Political)/1948/8(5)-P (vol. I). 
40
 Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia, 152±54. 
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The border also facilitated movement, though, by providing opportunities for those who 
were motivated by crime. Lucy Chester argues that the ERUGHUSURYLGHGDµVDIHVSDFH¶IRUWKRVH
who retreated back across it after venturing beyond its limit.41 For those who wished to evade 
detection by the state, however, WKHµVDIHVSDFH¶ZDVDUJXDEO\RQWKHRWKHUVLGHRIWKHborder, 
as it represented a clear end to state sovereignty and control. It enabled criminal activity by 
providing a clear point of departure from the jurisdiction of the state, and possibly even 
encouragement from hostile neighbours. As the border became increasingly real for local state 
actors, for whom it represented the limits of their authority, the threat posed by cross-border 
criminal networks was similarly heightened. At first, the reports collated by the East Punjab 
Government focused upon the migration of criminal refugees from Pakistan into the districts. 
In November 1947, in its fortnightly report to New Delhi, the East Punjab Government noted 
how these criminal refugees µKDG OLWWOH LQ WKH ZD\ RI ORFDO FRQWDFWV DQG VWLOO OHVV LQ ORFDO
NQRZOHGJH¶, seemingly posing little threat.42 By the early months of 1948, however, they 
reported an increase in criminal activity DQGSDUWLFXODUO\KRZWKHVHGLVSODFHGFULPLQDOVµhad 
DOUHDG\VWDUWHGJHWWLQJWRJHWKHUDQGIRUPLQJWKHPVHOYHVLQWRJDQJV¶43 Initially these networks 
were perceived as the reconstitution of criminal affiliations in new environs ± displaced 
criminals from West Punjab forming collectives in their new-found locales across the border. 
Soon, however, these reports began to speak more conclusiYHO\ RI µ/LDLVRQ [«] between 
FULPLQDOVRQWKHWZRVLGHVRIWKHERUGHU¶44  
Such cross-border networks were endowed ZLWK WUHDFKHURXV LQWHQW µ7KLV LV IXOO RI
GDQJHURXVSRWHQWLDOLWLHV¶WKH(DVW3XQMDEGRYHUQPHQWZDUQHGLQ0DUFKµDQGZRXOGQHHG
checking ZLWKDVWURQJKDQG¶45 Although criminal refugees within East Punjab were considered 
a threat to law and order, primarily because their unregulated movements since Partition 
allowed them to evade surveillance, it was the existence of criminal networks which punctuated 
the border that posed a more decisive danger to the state. IQWKHPHWDSKRURIWKHµLOOHJDOIORZ¶
± in this instance, the formation of networks between criminals ± the border symbolised µWKH
solid, the territorial, the ordered, the rule of ODZ¶, whereas that which crossed it became µWKH
IOXLGWKHVSDWLDOO\HOXVLYHWKHLQWUXVLYHWKHXQGHUZRUOG¶46 When considered in these terms, 
liaison between criminals on the two sides of the border did not merely have the potential to 
                                                          
41
 Chester, 154. 
42
 NAI/States(Political Rehabilitation)/1947/10(16)±PR. 
43
 NAI/States(Political)/1948/8(5)-P (vol. I). 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 van Schendel, ³6SDFHV of Engagement: How Borderlands, Illegal Flows, and Territorial States ,QWHUORFN´ 30. 
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undermine law and order within state boundaries, but could bring the unknown and unforeseen 
danger of criminality which existed beyond the border within the realm of the state. These 
QHWZRUNVZHUHQRWVLPSO\µLOOHJDO¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\UHSUHVHQWHGSRWHQWLDOWUDQVJUHVVLRns 
of the law but additionally, and more importantly, they represented transgression of the sanctity 
of the border, and thus the legitimacy of the state itself.  
The border therefore generated both uncertainties over legitimacy, loyalty and control, 
whilst simultaneously providing the means through which the state could assert itself anew. In 
the months and years after August 1947, the border was repeatedly constructed through the 
everyday practices and discourse of state actors as they sought to demarcate it on the ground, 
as well as by the actions of local residents and refugees alike. Drawing on the evidence supplied 
through bureaucratic channels by locally-rooted state officials, the East Punjab Government 
reframed local and circumstantial incidences within an overarching narrative of illegal cross-
border activity, which in turn brought the border into being not only locally on the ground in 
the borderlands of East Punjab but in the national imagination of the state. It was within this 
context that, at a more local level, similar discursive constructions of criminality flourished in 
Ferozepore with regard to the Rai Sikhs. Although located at the peripheral reaches of the state, 
the actions of local officials worked to situate the Rai Sikhs more conclusively within the 
boundaries of the criminal tribe by constructing their supposed criminality in relation to the 
border. This fostered a dialogue between district, province and nation, in which the Rai Sikhs 
were identified predominantly, if not entirely, with a criminality that was rooted in their 
supposed crossing of the border. 
&ULPLQDOLVLQJWKHµ&ULPLQDO7ULEH¶ 
Prior to 1947, the Rai Sikhs had only a negligible association with crime. Unlike certain 
communities, such as Sansis and Bawarias, who were classified as criminal tribes across all the 
districts of Punjab, only certain sections of the Mahtam/Rai Sikh community was declared as 
such in relation to specific villages, such as Mahtam in Lahore or Dhakkar in Montgomery.47 
Notably, in Dhakkar, it was specifically the Rai Sikh branch of the community whom were 
notified.48 Their characterisation as criminal was deeply contingent on local factors, especially 
the influence of neighbouring communities. Their declaration as criminal tribes in these areas 
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resulted from petitions forwarded by locally influential figures. In the village of Mahtam, for 
instance, two petitions were sent to the District Superintendent in 1887 by local residents who 
claimed that the community KDG µIURP WLPH LPPHPRULDOEHHQDGGLFWHG WR WKHIWRIJURZLQJ
FURSV¶EXWLQPRUHUHFHQWWLPHVKDGDOVRµWDNHQWRFDWWOHWKHIWDQGEXUJODU\¶49 In 1926, too, the 
Rai Sikhs of Dhakkar were reported to have DWWDLQHGDµEDGUHSXWDWLRQ¶DQGORFDOSROLFHRIILFHUV
µXQDQLPRXVO\¶VXSSRUWHGWKHGHFODUDWLRQ50 Unlike other criminal tribes, the Rai Sikhs were not 
placed within industrial or reformatory settlements.51 They were, however, subject to the 
standard supervisory measures afforded by the Act, such as giving daily attendance to the local 
police officer or village headman, from whom permission had to be sought if they intended to 
move beyond the limits of their village. Throughout most of the &ULPLQDO 7ULEHV $FW¶V
existence, though, only a miniscule part of the community was actively considered criminal or 
subject to its provisions. 
During Partition, tens of thousands of Rai Sikhs were displaced into Ferozepore from 
the districts which fell to West Punjab, predominantly Montgomery.52 Their movements 
formed part of a more comprehensive displacement of groups in the region who were, whether 
directly or only tangentially, associated with the Criminal Tribes Act. Although the criminal 
tribes are rarely, if ever, acknowledged in official, popular or scholarly narratives of Partition, 
they also fled across the border in vast numbers to seek refuge with their co-religionists. Similar 
to many other low caste or untouchable groups, these communities did, contrary to dominant 
assumptions, face violence, forced conversion, or ejection from their localities, often with little 
or delayed assistance from the state.53 Displaced criminal tribes included both Muslims, such 
as Bilochis and Ods who migrated to West Punjab, and Hindus and Sikhs, such as Bazigars, 
Lubanas, Sansis, Bhedkuts and Bawarias who migrated to East Punjab.54 All those declared as 
criminal tribes were internally heterogeneous communities whose occupations, social customs 
and association with criminality were determined by contingent local factors and circumstance. 
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However, their pre-existing, if circumstantial, association with criminality became more 
pronounced in the context of Partition.  
Partition severely undermined the systems of surveillance and restriction which ensured 
the functioning of the Criminal Tribes Act. Amid the mass migration, the village headmen and 
local policemen who performed roll call and checked the vast paper trails of registers, history 
sheets and exemption passes often moved to new localities.55 The arrival of these so-called 
criminal tribes into new environs with little or no documentation produced acute fears amongst 
certain state authorities over their criminal intent. Their migrations were quickly conflated with 
an increase in reported crime, particularly theft. In 1949, The Tribune reported that, in the 
immediate aftermath of Partition, the East Punjab Government had WR µWUDFHDQGORFDWH>WKH
displaced criminal tribes] who were KLGLQJRUOLYLQJXQGHUDVVXPHGQDPHGDQGFDVWHV¶LQRUGHU
WR FRPPLW µVHULRXV FULPHV¶56 In response, the Deputy Commissioner for Criminal Tribes 
circulated directions to all police officers and district magistrates in the state to hold 
µVLPXOWDQHRXVUDLGV¶to register newly-arrived individuals and to cancel the passes of those who 
claimed to be exempted from the Act.57 It was after independence, as the Criminal Tribes Act 
was being legally dismantled in New Delhi, that the categorisation of the criminal tribe thus 
took on heightened salience in the practices of the state.  
It was within this context that the Rai Sikhs became more conclusively aligned with the 
category of the criminal tribe. Whilst stemming partly from these broader state concerns, their 
specific case resulted from a series of competing and sometimes contradictory initiatives by 
state actors to demarcate the border. Most of the displaced Rai Sikhs were settled by local 
authorities in the tehsils of Fazilka and Ferozepore, which adjoined the Indo-Pakistan border.58 
In addition to the displacement of communities from Pakistan, local Rai Sikhs within 
Ferozepore itself were uprooted. They had been the tenants of Muslim landowners who 
migrated to Pakistan and were consequently ejected from the agricultural land on which they 
worked, and from the houses which became declared as evacuee property. Faced with this 
uprooted population, district officers allotted them temporary land along riveraine tracts 
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stretching from Jagewala on the Jullundur side of the district to Pucca Christi near Sulemanki, 
covering a distance of around 100 miles along the border. The initially stated reason for settling 
the Rai Sikhs in this stretch was that, in keeping with the land redistribution policies of the East 
Punjab Government, many of them had cultivated similar land in the West Punjab.59 Soon, 
however, this reasoning changed. By 1953, the question had arisen whether the settlement of 
Rai Sikhs along this tract would compromise, or indeed fortify, the border. 
In the intervening period, state officials in the region, and consequently the local press, 
had begun to increasingly portray the Rai Sikhs in terms of a collective identity which was 
defined by dacoity, danger and disruption of the border. In their dialogues with the East Punjab 
Government, local state actors emphasised the ability of the Rai Sikhs to traverse, and in effect 
transcend, the border. In November 1947, for instance, three Rai Sikhs from Ferozepore were 
LPSOLFDWHGLQUDLGLQJFDWWOHIURPWKHYLOODJHRI.KLZDDVLWZDVUHSRUWHGWKDWWKH\µVZDPSHG
DFURVVWKH6XWOHMDQGWRRNDZD\KHDGVRIFDWWOHIRXQGJUD]LQJRQWKHULYHUEDQN¶60 Both the 
symbolic line of the international border and the physical boundary of the Sutlej itself had 
purportedly proved little hindrance to their movements. Although actual incidences of their 
physical movement across the border were relatively rarely reported, their perceived use of 
cross-border communications and networks was portrayed as a thoroughly organised and 
GHHSO\HQWUHQFKHGSXQFWXULQJRIWKHERUGHUµ>7@KH\DUHQRWDERYHVPXJJOLQJDQGFRPLQJWR
an arrangement with nationals of Pakistan for sucKDFWLYLWLHV¶S. Vohra, Deputy Commissioner 
of Ferozepore, reported.61 %\VXSSRVHGO\FROOXGLQJZLWKµQDWLRQDOVRI3DNLVWDQ¶HVSHFLDOO\LQ
the context of fluctuating tensions between the two nations, the Rai Sikhs had seemingly 
undermined the very identity and legitimacy of the nation through their behaviour. 
The threat supposedly posed by the Rai Sikhs was additionally rooted in their ability to 
travel long distances from the border space into the inner reaches of India: in effect, penetrating 
the centre from the periphery. During the years 1948-54, The Tribune regularly reported the 
unlawful activities of a high-SURILOHµJDQJRIGDFRLWV¶ZKREHORQJHGWRWKH5DL6LNKFRPPXQLW\
and operated in the borderlands of the Punjab region.62 Their depredations extended beyond 
the Indo-Pakistani border as they also reportedly committed dacoities which resultHGµin the 
ORVVRIOLIHDQGSURSHUW\¶ within the internal borders between Punjab, the erstwhile Princely 
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States, Rajasthan, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh.63 Although the international border commanded the 
most concern, the existence of numerous internal borders in the region was believed to similarly 
facilitate their crime. Until 1956, the former Princely States were administered separately from 
the state of Punjab under the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU). As such, police 
IRUFHVIURP3XQMDEDQG3(368UHJXODUO\PHWµWRGHYLVHPHDVXUHVWRHQVXUHEHWWHUFR-ordination 
of preventative and detective work on the two VLGHVRIWKHERUGHU¶64 The problem, the East 
Punjab Government reportedZDVWKDWWKHVHFULPLQDOHOHPHQWVµLQWKHLUDFWXDORSHUDWLRQVSD\
OLWWOHUHJDUGWRWHUULWRULDOERXQGDULHVEHWZHHQWKHWZRDGPLQLVWUDWLYHXQLWV¶65 
The activities of these dacoits were seemingly exemplified in 1953 when the police 
forces in Nainital, present day Uttarakhand, congratulated themselves for having dispelled the 
µSDQLF¶FDXVHGE\DQLQILOWUDWLRQRI5DL6LNKVLQWRWKHDUHD,QUHVSRQVHWRWKHVKRUWVXSSO\RI
adequate agricultural labourers in the Terai and Bhabar colonies after 1947, farm owners 
imported the supposedly µKDUG\¶5DL6LNKVIURPWKHERUGHUUHJLRQVRIEast Punjab to work on 
the land. Soon, however, the local police forces reported that the Rai Sikhs were exploiting 
their links to the border: 
7KHµPRGXVRSHUHQGL¶RIWKHVHFULPLQDOVZDVWKDWWKH\ZRXOGFROOHFWLQIRUPDWLRQ
DERXWWKHLUµZRXOG-EHYLFWLPV¶DQGFDOOWKHLUdare-devils from their original place on the 
Indo-Pakistan border and with their help would commit dacoities, highway robberies, and 
other crimes and thereafter sharing the booty here they would go back to their respective 
homes on the Punjab border.66 
To contain this perceived threat, police forces from East Punjab were drafted to Nainital 
to identify their border residents ± WKHµFULPLQDOHOHPHQW¶± and send them back to their colonies 
in Ferozepore. Although the press implicated the Rai Sikhs in the criminal activity as an entire 
community, it was the individuals who migrated inwards from the border who were especially 
PDUNHGRXWDVEHLQJWKHµGDUH-GHYLOV¶ZKRFR-ordinated the attacks. The border residents were 
attributed with an apparent borderland mentality which determined their criminal behaviour, 
which the imported Nainital labourers had exploited for their own gain. By penetrating into the 
inner reaches of India, such criminal constructions suggested, the Ferozepore Rai Sikhs had 
not only undermined the peace of the Nainital region but had brought a specifically borderland 
form of crime into the heart of India. 
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The Rai Sikh population in the district of Ferozepore alone numbered above 80,000 
after Partition. By the early 1950s, however, the community was decisively associated with 
criminality within the bureaucratic discourse of the state. µ,DP>«@LQQRGRXEWWKDWWKHVH5DL
Sikhs, especially those who came to Ferozepore after the partition, were notorious for cattle-
OLIWLQJEXUJODU\GDFRLW\ LOOLFLW GLVWLOODWLRQ DQGFRXQWHUIHLWLQJFRLQV¶ UHSRUWHG WKH ,QVSHFWRU
General of Police in 1953.67 Whilst reporting to the East Punjab Government, state officials 
IDEULFDWHGKRZµDOPRVWDOO¶RIWKH5DL6LNKVKDGEHHQQRWLILHGXQGHUWKH&ULPLQDO7ULEHV$FW
prior to 1947.68 The Inspector General did refer to 11 villages in the Attari district of 
Montgomery, potentially alluding to the villages over which the Criminal Tribes Department 
had assumed control in the 1940s. His statement, however, referred to the Rai Sikhs collectively 
± as a homogenous community with shared characteristics, principally an inclination for illicit 
DFWLYLWLHV7KLVGUHZSDUDOOHOVZLWKWKHµUKHWRULFDOVWUDWHJLHV¶HPSOR\HGE\FRORQLDORIILFHUVLQ
the initial notification of communities from the 1870s, whereby scant evidence could be 
overcome by discursive flourishes and recourse to questionable ethnographic proof.69 Now, 
though, these constructions of criminality were rooted in the distinctive setting of Partition. It 
was not only their prior association with criminality which was remarked upon by state actors, 
but rather their displacement during the overall chaos in Punjab during 1947-8 which was cited 
DV KDYLQJ HQFRXUDJHG WKHLU XQODZIXO EHKDYLRXU µ$IWHU 3DUWLWLRQ WKHLU FULPLQDO DFWLYLW\ KDV
increased to a considerable extent. Their confreres in the U.P. Terai districts and in Karnal 
afford them an opportunity to have safe contacts for disposing stolen cattle and property and 
IRUVHHNLQJVKHOWHUDQGHYDGLQJWKHJUDVSRIWKHSROLFH¶UHSRUWHGDeputy Commissioner Vohra 
in 1953.70  
There was little evidence to support such a characterisation, however. Amid the regular 
correspondence fielded between the Ferozepore officials and the East Punjab Government, 
there were few references to arrests or the imprisonment of Rai Sikhs. Although the Criminal 
Tribes Act remained in place until 1952, there is no evidence to suggest that greater numbers 
of the Rai Sikhs were notified under it. ,QGHHG)HUR]HSRUH¶V6XSHULQWHQGHQWRI3ROLFHZDVRQH
RI WKH IHZRIILFHUVZLWKLQ(DVW3XQMDE¶V3ROLFe Department who favoured the repeal of the 
Criminal Tribes Act.71 Certain individuals may have turned to crime, whether impelled by 
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personal gain or the hardships which followed their displacement from the land. But whilst 
there were individual instances of members of the Rai Sikh community travelling across the 
border, sometimes for criminal ends, there was little evidence to support such claims for the 
Rai Sikhs as a collective group. Vohra even once DGPLWWHGWKDWµ7KHUHLVQRWPXFKWHQGHQF\
amongst them WR OHDYH WKH%RUGHU¶72 The framing of their collective identity in terms of a 
criminal proclivity rested more upon hearsay and vacuous notions about criminal desire. For 
instance, Vohra further remarked that, µ7KH5DL6LNKVVHHPWRKDYHYHU\OLWWOHPRUDOinhibitions 
DERXWLQGXOJLQJLQFULPH¶.73 Of course, this characterisation was at least partly rooted in their 
pre-existing association with the Criminal Tribes Act. Although the administration of the Act 
was incoherent and locally-contingent, by 1947 it had acquired widespread notoriety. Even 
many of those who advocated its repeal implicitly accepted the premise that certain 
communities were predisposed towards crime.74 In the context of Partition, the fragmentation 
of state apparatus, and uncertainties over the legitimacy and authority of the state, however, 
the tag of criminality attained greater significance in the bureaucratic and discursive practices 
of the state. 
Demarcating the Border 
The criminal construction of the Rai Sikhs after 1947 had more instrumental ends too, 
though. Through their actions, local state authorities popularised and wrote into administration 
WKH 5DL 6LNKV¶ FROOHFWLYH LGHQWLW\ DV FULPLQDO IUDmed primarily in terms of their ability to 
transgress the space of the border. In the process, these state actors brought the border into 
effect. Their repeated articulations of the threatened sanctity of the border made an unnatural 
and artificial boundary appear permanent and real, contravention of which was the preserve of 
immoral and criminal communities. At the same time, these portrayals were translated into 
state initiatives which aimed to materially demarcate the border, not merely in dialogue or 
imagination but physically on the ground. The border thus provided the means through which 
the uncertainties and flux it had produced could be overcome.  
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Paradoxically, it was these constructions of criminality in the years after 1947 which 
made the Rai Sikhs of Ferozepore particularly indispensable to this process. In effect, through 
their marking out in bureaucratic discourse, the Rai Sikhs came to encompass a distinct and 
cohesive category, one which was defined simultaneously in terms of ± and in necessary co-
existence with ± danger to and defence of the border. From the early 1950s, a series of state 
initiatives sought to physically situate the Rai Sikhs more decidedly in these border zones. A 
central figure in this process was S. Vohra, the Deputy Commissioner for Ferozepore. Although 
reports detailing the cross-border movements and criminal intent of the Rai Sikhs had emanated 
IURPVHYHUDOVRXUFHV9RKUD¶VUROHLQWUDQVODWLQJWKHVHLQWRPDWHULDOSUDFWLFHVZDVGHFLVLYH+H
served as Deputy Commissioner, the executive head of the district, from March 1953 to April 
1955 ± a period coinciding with the most sustained interest from the East Punjab Government 
in the Rai Sikhs.75 Frequently engaging in dialogue with those in the higher rungs of the state, 
Vohra repeatedly reiterated the criminality of the Rai Sikhs, but now with the intent of more 
concretely demarcating the border.  
9RKUD¶VHIIRUWVFHQWUHGXSRn the reformable nature of the criminal tribe. Since the early 
1900s, the Criminal Tribes Act sought to prevent crime through both punitive (such as 
registration and surveillance) and reformatory (provision of education, employment, and 
µPRUDO¶WHDFKLQJVPHDVXUHV76 In a similar vein, Vohra embarked on a scheme of rehabilitation 
and uplift in the Rai SikhV¶ borderland settlements, ostensibly to µUHIRUP¶WKHFRPPXQLW\IURP
its perceived criminal proclivities. The scheme included the provision of educational facilities, 
compulsory attendance at school, the introduction of civil and veterinary dispensaries, and the 
development of infrastructure in the region, particularly the connection of their cut-off colonies 
with nearby towns. These schemes were undertaken with the aim of more deeply entrenching 
the Rai Sikhs in close proximity to the Indo-Pakistani ERUGHUµ>:@HQHHGWRWDNHVWHSVWRURRW
this tribe more firmly on the border by giving these landless persons a stake in the soil over 
WKHUH¶Vohra argued.77 His reasoning was calculated and two-fold. First, Vohra argued that the 
reputation of the Rai Sikhs as a dangerous community would deter incursions by Pakistani 
officials or citizens across the border. This was a subject of acute importance for those officials 
stationed along the border, upon whom responsibility for its defence fell. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, the rehabilitation of the Rai Sikhs warranted an extension of state 
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development, funds and influence to the furthest reaches of its jurisdiction ± in effect, the 
µmoral reclamation¶ of the Rai Sikhs legitimatised a greater state presence in the border regions 
of East Punjab. 
In 1953, the East Punjab Government enquired of Vohra the possibilities of 
permanently settling the Rai Sikhs along the border: 
Have they settled down satisfactorily on the border? Are they or are they not useful 
on the border as a check against any Pakistani inroads? The incidence of criminal 
SURSHQVLW\ DPRQJ WKHP QRZ DV FRPSDUHG ZLWK SUHSDUWLWLRQ WLPHV >«@ +RZ KDYH WKH\
behaved on being entrusted with Border Defence weapons, etc? How have they settled 
down as cultivators? Has there been any tendency among them to go away from the 
border?78 
This statement reveals the increased interest of the East Punjab Government in the Rai Sikhs 
as a potential means of defending the border in the context of increasingly fraught bilateral 
relations between India and Pakistan. Recent scholarship has demonstrated the often-
overlooked spaces of co-operation and compromise between the two nation-states in the years 
after 1947.79 Yet, the period was also marked by hostility, antagonism, and armed conflict.80 
As tension escalated in other arenas ± such as in Kashmir during late 1947 ± the border regions 
of Punjab became entangled in the dispute as the Indian and Pakistani Governments armed 
local residents in anticipation of conflict.81 More locally, the border in divided Punjab 
represented a space of both co-operation and contestation between the provincial and national 
governments.82 On the one hand, the national governments could reach agreements over 
villages technically awarded to one country but came to be administered by the other owing to 
geographical concerns.83 On the other, disputes arose over control of natural resources ± 
notably over the Indus ± and the limits of territory and concerns of national security.84 
These fluctuating concerns of the provincial and national governments contrasted with 
the long-held priorities of the local state actors. As Daniel Haines has demonstrated with regard 
to disputes over the canal headworks in the region, local perspectives are vital for 
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understanding how borders, and by extension sovereignty, were conceived in post-1947 East 
and West Punjab.85 Local officials were frequently the most vociferous advocates for rigidly 
defending the territoriality and integrity of the border space, whereas provincial and national 
imperatives were characterised more by fluidity and pragmatism. Through their bureaucratic 
practices, ORFDO VWDWH DFWRUV µZRUNHG WR WUDQVODWH ORFDO ERUGHU VSDFHV LQWR SODFHVRIQDWLRQDO
LPSRUWDQFH¶86 Similarly, it was Vohra who was most immediately and consistently 
preoccupied with preserving the integrity of the border, and in the process sought to mark out 
)HUR]HSRUH¶VERUGHUUHJLRQDVRQHRISURYLQFLDORUHYHQQDWLRQDOFRQFHUQ.   
The criminal constructions of the Rai Sikhs since 1947 were a necessary precursor to 
9RKUD¶V identification of them as a potential means to bolster its defence. In a seemingly 
contradictory policy, the very threat which the local state authorities had narrated ± that the Rai 
Sikhs could transgress the border ± also determined their perceived utility in defending the 
border from similar, but Pakistani, incursions.87 µ, HQWLUHO\ DJUHH ZLWK WKH >'HSXW\
Commissioner] that we could not find any other tribe better qualified than the Rai Sikhs, to 
SURWHFW RXU ERUGHU ZLWK 3DNLVWDQ¶ UHSRUWHG WKH ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO RI 3ROLFH GHVSLWH LQ D
previous sentence, remarking WKDWµ7KH\KDYHVLQFHWKHSDUWLWLRQFRQWLQXHGWRFRPPLWFULPH
HVSHFLDOO\KLJKZD\UREEHULHVDQGGDFRLW\¶88 Their perceived danger was thus translated into a 
potential means of defence. As such, the Rai Sikhs had been issued with rifles under the 
Defence Schemes inaugurated to prevent encroachment by Pakistani authorities or persons 
across the border. As Vohra VWDWHG µWKLV ZDV QHFHVVDU\ IURP WKH point of view of border 
defence¶.89 For local authorities, it was their immediate physicality to the fragile and permeable 
border in the years after 1947 which had necessitated certain actions to uphold its actuality.  
At the same time, by constructing the criminality of the Rai Sikhs in these terms, Vohra 
justified the extension of state development to its peripheral reaches. µ,WLVWUXHWKDWWKH\DUH
addicted to illicit distillation and drinking but they also do not get a chance to improve in view 
of the bad reputation with which they have been saddled and will no doubt respond to extension 
of development activity in their area¶KHZURWH.90 Once Vohra had satisfied the East Punjab 
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Government that the Rai Sikhs µFHUWDLQO\KROGWKHLURZQLQGD\WRGD\³JLYHDQGWDNH´DFURVV
WKH%RUGHU¶and would thereby act as a deterrence to Pakistani encroachment, they advised 
him WRPDNHµVSHFLDOHIIRUWV [«] for looking after the welfare of these people. More in the way 
of schools, roads, dispensaries, etc., is needed¶.91 This was couched in terms of rehabilitation, 
or a reclamation from moral turpitude, although the clearly perceived benefits to the security 
of the nation were also noted. µ7KDW would, I think, pay the Government good dividends also, 
because we do need tough people like these fellows to be on the border where they are in that 
very difficult tract of the country¶QRWHGDQDGYLVHUWRWKH&KLHI0LQLVWHU.92 The rehabilitation 
of the Rai Sikhs had been a long-standing local concern. In the months after 1947, the district 
administration had received 7,000 applications for leases of evacuee land from members of the 
community.93 In the early 1950s, the majority of these were unrealised, and the community 
remained largely landless. Their socio-economic status therefore only became a concern of the 
East Punjab Government when defence of the border became a priority.  
Rehabilitation contained a paradox, however. If the Rai Sikhs were to be adequately 
reclaimed from their supposed immoral pursuits, would they continue to pose a sufficient threat 
to potential incursions from across the border? The seeming solution to this problem was that 
9RKUD¶VSURSRVHG welfare schemes would in themselves extend state authority and influence, 
thereby more clearly delineating sovereignty at the still un-demarcated space of the border. 
9RKUDKDGUHSRUWHGWRWKH(DVW3XQMDE*RYHUQPHQWWKDWµ7KHQXPEHURI5DL6LNKVZKRDUH
HGXFDWHG LV LQILQLWHVLPDO¶94 +LV µORQJ WHUP VROXWLRQ¶ ± seemingly to both their educational 
status and the defence of the border ± ZDVµWRLQFUHDVHWKHHGXFDWLRQDOIDFLOLWLHVE\PDNLQJD
VSHFLDOJUDQWIRUWKHSXUSRVHWRRSHQVFKRROVLQWKHDUHDDQGLQWURGXFHFRPSXOVRU\HGXFDWLRQ¶95 
The Rai Sikhs were still marked out as a distinct community, but now as an object for state 
ZHOIDUH DQG GHYHORSPHQW 7KLV µEDFNZDUGQHVV¶ ZDV KRZHYHU OLQNHG GLUHFWO\ WR WKHLU
µLQGXOJLQJLQFULPH¶SDUWLFXODUO\FDWWOHWKHIWDQGWKHLOOLFLWGLVWLOODWLRQRIOLTXRU 
By ePSKDVLVLQJWKHµEDFNZDUGQHVV¶RIWKH5DL6LNKVSULPDULO\DUWLFXODWHGWKURXJKWKH
lens of criminality, Vohra convinced the provincial government of the need to expand state 
infrastructure and development. The East Punjab Government agreed with the scheme, but 
needed to obtain the approval of New Delhi. 7KH*RYHUQPHQWRI,QGLD¶VSROLF\DVQRWHGE\
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officials in East Punjab, ZDVµWRJLYHHPSKDVLVWRDUHDVLQKDELWHGE\EDFNZDUGSHRSOH¶96 µ$OO
WKDWQHHGVWREHGRQH¶RQHRIILFLDOVWDWHGLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHVFKHPHZDVµWREULQJWRWKHQRWLFH
of the various Departments the fact of the backwardness of this tribe and the need for expanding 
DFWLYLWLHVLQWKHUHJLRQLQKDELWHGE\WKHP¶97 Constructing the criminality of the Rai Sikhs thus 
worked to reimagine the overlooked border tracts of Ferozepore into a space of national 
interest, both in terms of border defence and by delineating the Rai Sikhs as a project of welfare 
and development.  
One initiative which exemplified this developmental project was the metalling of the 
seven miles of road which connected Mamdot ± around which many of the Rai Sikh colonies 
were located ± with the Ferozepore-Fazilka road. (DVW3XQMDE¶VHome Secretary claimed the 
initiative should be undertaken with the primary aim of enabling the Rai Sikhs to sell their 
produce in more profitable markets, and thus lessen their dependence upon crime. Yet, he 
simultaneously noted that it would have µVWUDWHJLF YDOXH¶.98 The convergence of national, 
provincial and local concerns regarding the integrity of the border were evident in the 
negotiations over which level of the state should bear the cost of the road - the Government of 
India, the military, the East Punjab Government, or the local district board. They all had 
competing claims and relationships with the border space, yet these largely coalesced over the 
settlement and reclamation of the Rai Sikhs. As voiced by Vohra, the project ZRXOGµRSHQXS
WKLVKLQWHUODQG¶ ± ostensibly for the Rai Sikhs but additionally, and in certain respects more 
importantly, for the various levels of the state.99 
Conclusion 
The trajectory of the Rai Sikhs in East Punjab after 1947 is revealing of the wider 
predicament of the so-called criminal tribes after independence in India. Despite the repeal of 
the Criminal Tribes Act in August 1952, the association of these communities with notions of 
criminality, however defined, continued to inform the parameters of their relationship to the 
state. As several scholars have argued, postcolonial legalities need to be interrogated in specific 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOVLWHVWRLGHQWLI\WKRVHµHOHPHQWVRIWKHFRORQLDOWKDWUHPDLQERXQGRUFRQWDLQHG¶
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within them.100 In some regions, such as Madras and Bombay, the measures of the Criminal 
7ULEHV $FW ZHUH VZLIWO\ UHFRQILJXUHG ZLWKLQ OHJLVODWLRQ WKDW WDUJHWHG LQGLYLGXDO µKDELWXDO
RIIHQGHUV¶RVWHQVLEO\PRYLQJWRPRUHµHQOLJKWHQHG¶DQGOLEHUDOSHQDOSURFHGXUHV101 Elsewhere, 
such as East Punjab and Delhi, the state goverQPHQWVZHUHYRFLIHURXVRSSRQHQWVWRWKH$FW¶V
repeal. The continued use of instruments of surveillance and control ± whether implicitly 
through new legislation and policies or explicitly through retention of the old ± against criminal 
tribes in the years immediately after 1947 reveals the difficulties of disentangling postcolonial 
legalities from their colonial forebears. Yet, the example of the Rai Sikhs points to a far messier 
picture than a simple narrative of colonial inheritance allows. 
As this article has demonstrated, local state actors in Ferozepore marked out the Rai 
Sikhs in their bureaucratic practices and dialogue with the government in terms of a collective 
criminality. This was at odds with their status during the colonial period when only a small 
minority of the community had been incorporated within the purview of the Criminal Tribes 
Act. In a departure from the existing scholarship on the Act, which is overwhelmingly colonial 
in focus, this article foregrounds the immediate postcolonial period. It has demonstrated that it 
was during the months and years after 1947, rather than in the preceding decades, that the Rai 
Sikhs became more conclusively aligned with the category of the criminal tribe in the practices 
of the state. As illustrated at the beginning of the article, such categorisation remains 
entrenched in bureaucratic structures and everyday prejudice, even today.102 The Rai Sikhs, 
VLPLODUWRPDQ\RIWKHQRZµGHQRWLILHG¶FRPPXQLWLHVLQ,QGLDcontinued to be implicated with 
the category and are RIWHQRQWKHµZDWFKOLVW¶RIWKHSROLFH103 By moving beyond the temporal 
limits of the colonial project and instead interrogating these critical years of decolonisation and 
state-building, a more complex understanding of the criminal tribe emerges. 
The postcolonial criminalisation of the Rai Sikhs was a consequence of local (and at 
times congruent provincial and national) imperatives to delineate the newly imposed but not 
yet demarcated border. As illustrated by FerozeporH¶V'HSXW\&RPPLVVLRQHULWZDVthe local 
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state actors who directed, negotiated or constituted the state on the ground who were vital 
agents in this process. By constructing the criminality of the Rai Sikhs in relation to the border, 
local state actors helped to perform it. They ascribed the border with an actuality which was 
borne out through their everyday actions and dialogue, thereby bringing the border ± and the 
5DL 6LNKV¶ VXSSRVHG FULPLQDOLW\ DORQJVLGH LW ± into effect. Through the criminalisation of 
certain forms of cross-border movements ± and supposedly cross-border peoples ± these state 
practices produced the border as a natural, tangible, and territorially-defined line on the ground. 
More than merely performing the border in the state or public imagination, though, these 
constructions of criminality also justified an extension of state presence to the peripheral 
reaches of its jurisdiction. In effect, this demarcated state sovereignty and authority in a 
physical and material sense, in a period when the border space was often characterised by 
informality and contingency at the local level. 
The example of the Rai Sikhs further underlines the necessity for rethinking the ways 
in which peripheral, marginal or supposedly criminal communities were also integral to the 
processes of decolonisation, state-building and territorial demarcation in postcolonial India, 
and beyond. Indeed, the utilisation of the supposed criminality of the Rai Sikhs after 1947 finds 
parallels across the border. The settlement of Pathans along the border in West Punjab 
demonstrates that similar processes were underway in Pakistan and suggests the need for 
comparative cross-border work.104 Such histories point to the paradoxes and inherent 
contingency that characterised the early postcolonial state. In particular, the criminalisation of 
the Rai Sikhs reveals WKH LQKHULWDQFHRI µFRORQLDO¶ FDWHJRULHVRIGLIIHUHQFH that marked out 
µGDQJHURXV¶ RU µFULPLQDO¶ FRPPXQLWLHV, but were reimagined within the framework of 
decidedly postcolonial projects of developmental programmes, the welfare state, and border-
making. These projects were, of course, necessarily fragmented and subject to competing and 
often contradictory imperatives of manifold state actors, working at local, provincial and 
national levels of the state. Yet, they generated a bureaucratic discourse and set of practices 
centred on a constructed criminality of the Rai Sikhs which have had enduring ramifications 
for both the communities themselves and the nature of the state. 
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